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1. THE MONETARY SITUATION
At the present time a multiplicity of institutions designed to
mobilize voluntary savings, hold active deposits and extend credit
exist in Indonesia, Despite the abundance of financial institutions
to perform these essential economic functions, the channeling of
voluntary savings into investment has been virtually nil. This paper
will therefore be an inquiry into the potential role of this type offinancing in Indonesian economic development and the means by which
the effectiveness of private and public financial institutions may be
strengthened.
The hypothesis which will be argued is that the recent monetary
impact of these institutions has been highly inflationary. Neither
public nor private banking institutions have accumulated savings
from current income. The greater part of the banking system's
reserves against which credits have been extended have been obtained
from governmental resources. These resources have by and large pro-
vided the capital and deposits from which the monetary system as a
whole has created new funds made available to private and public
borrowers. In the meantime, the government itself has been operating
at sizeable deficits; hence, the banking system has exerted dual
inflationary stimuli upon the econong: one generated directly by the
government deficit (financed through the banking system), and the
other generated by the government providing the financial base from
which the banking system has created new funds.
From the point of view of Indonesia's paramount economic objectives--
economi c development and economic stability-the inflationary quality(credit creation) of the banking system as a whole should be re-
stricted. The role of financial institutions during the period of
Indonesian economic development should rather be concerned with
channeling of savings from current income into investment. Thus the
savings mobilization aspect of their operations should be strengthened,
This view of the role of financial institutions in financing
Indonesian development is based on the existing inflationary potential
of the Indonesian econong. The imminence of inflation and the exis-
tence of inflationary pressures is based on data presented in the
following tables. The evidence of inflationary forces are shown
explicitly in these tables in the case of expanded money supply and
1
2rising prices in the urban sector. However, the spotty response of
prices to newly created money obscures the latent inflationary
potential resulting from continuously expanded money supply.
Table 1. PONEY SUPPLY IN INDONESIA
(Rp. million)
Total 5 %
Currency Deposits money currency deposits
Supply
1952 December 4349.2 2370.0 6719.2 64.7 35.3
1953 January 4378.5 2619.3 6997.8 62.6 37.4
March 4664.5 2611.9 7276.4 64.1 35.9
June 5020.9 2183.6 7204.5 69.7 30.3
September 5083.6 2383.3 7466.9 68.1 31.9
December 5217.7 2423.8 7641.5 68.1 31.9
1954 January 5256.8 2396.1 7652.9 68.7 31.3
February 5233.0 2323.7 7556.7 68.0 32.0
March 5334.9 2528.7 7863.6 67.8 32.2
April 5534.3 2384.2 7918.5 69.9 30.1
May 6123.2 2265.7 8388.9 73.0 27.o
June 6135.4 2576.3 8691.7 70.4 29.6
Source: Bank Indonesia Bulletin
Table 2. PRODUCTION OF FOOD CROPS IN INDONESIA
1951-1953
(000 tons)
1951 1952 1953
Rice irrigated 5,259 5,507 6,023
non-wirrigated 546 580 642
Maize (kernels) 2,350 2,611 2,416
Cassava (roots) 7,900 8,232 8,332
Batatas (roots) 1,030 L,3t4 1,319
Ground nuts (peeled) 184 158 196
Soya beans (peeled) 2701 2811 3041
Source: Bank Indonesia Report
1. Total for 1951, 17,539; 1952, 18,713; 1953, 19,232.
Table 3. PRICE INDEX NUMBERS OF FOODSTUFFS AND COST OF LIVING
Foodstuffs Coat of Living
12 foodstuffs 19 foodstuffs European Unskilled
July 1938.100 July 19380100 middle Class worker
_ --I _ _  Jan. 1950-100 July 1938-100
Countryside of Djakarta Medan Nakasar Djakara Djakarta
Java & Madura
1952 December 3,611 2,644 2,652 2,315 199 2,394
1953 March 3,140 2,739 2,770 2,416 218 2,362
June 2,956 2,838 2,725 2,427 230 2,324
September 3,065 2,728 2,915 2,358 228 2,267
December 3,501 2,934 2,903 2,435 238 2,421
1954 January 3,429 2,927 2,828 2,451 241 2,529
February 3,261 2,898 2,802 2,502 240 2,580
March 3,116 2,865 2,808 2,512 240 2,573
April 2,877 2,868 2,843 2,514 241 2,514
May 2,722 2,879 2,934 2,529 244 2,496
June 2,690 2,887 2,542 244 2,515
Source: Bank Indonesia Report and Bulletins.
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These tables show an interesting relationship between production of
basic food supplies, the money supply, prices and cost of living.
Domestic production of food supplies in 1953 increased by 8 percent
over the previous year. The total supply of food in the economy
was not greatly expanded, however, following the reduction of govern-
ment rice imports in cognisance of the increased domestic production.
Although total output figures are not available, it appears that
supply of other goods remained relatively constant in the face of
relatively small output gains in some sectors and severely reduced
imports of all consumer goods. During 1953 total money supply(M and W ) expanded by 14 percent. The most noticeable result of
these conditions is the variation in price response by sectors. The
prices of foodstuffs consumed in the countryside (primarily domestically
produced) actually fell between December 1952 and December 1953. On
the other hand, the prices of foodstuffs (including some imported
goods) in the large cities of Djakarta, Medan and Makassar rose some-
what. The same holds true for the cost of living index of the un-
skilled labor in Djakarta. However, a significant increase in the
cost of living for the European middle class or the Indonesian civil
servant group was recorded during 1953. In the first half of 1954,
prices and the cost of living pertinent to the countryside and the
unskilled worker in the urban sector continued to fall while total
money supply expanded by Rp. 1 billion--28 percent above December 1952
and 14 percent above December 1953. On the other hand, the cost of
living pertinent to the European middle class or the Indonesian civil
servant in Djakarta rose substantially during this period. One of
the basic reasons for this result was the increasingly strict import
policy followed by the Indonesian government. The value of consumer
goods imported into Indonesia fell from Rp. 5,302 million in 1952 to
Rp. 3,740 million in 1953. During the first half of 1954 an even
more drastic policy of reducing consumer goods imports was implemented
As a result, the 1954 level of imports of consumer goods will fall
even below that recorded in 1953. Furthermore, in 1954 the infla-
tionary stimuli working on the economy will be considerably greater
than in 1953. This will result from the fact that the government
deficit will be considerably larger in 1954 than that experienced in
the previous year. On the other hand, the countervailing deflationary
force of a deficit in the current account of the balance of payments
will be considerably lower in 1954 than it was in 1953.
The paradox of relatively mild price responses to a sub.-
stantially increased flow of money without significant accompanying
increases in total supply of goods can be explained by two important
monetary factors. In the first place, the circulation of newly
created money resulting from the inflationary forces working on the
economy tends to be limited to the urban sector in which it is
generated. Government expenditures both for supplies of goods and
personnel are undertaken primarily in this sector. Moreover, the
expansion of private credit, inflationary in nature as explained
above, became an increasingly important factor in the first half of
51954. In great part, this credit is extended to the trading and
emerging industrialist groups in the urban sector. In effect,
therefore, the income increases resulting from the newly generated
additions to the income stream end up in the urban sector. The
supply of goods in this sector, against which this new income can
be expressed as demand, has been particularly scarce. This has
primarily resulted from the restrictive consumer goods import policy
followed by recent Cabinets. The consequence has been a reduction
in the velocity of money in this sector concomitant with the increased
supply of currency and deposits, Thus it can be argued that govern-
ment policy aimed at import control has been tantamount in effect to
anti-inflationary monetary policy since the velocity factor in the
monetary equation has been reduced. This result, however, produces
thorry problems in developmental financing generally, and particularly
for extension of the type of financing provided by the governmental
and private banks during the past few years.
The impact of strict control of the import of consumers goods
has been tantamount to an enforced reduction in the propensity to
consume among the middle and upper income groups in the urban sector*
Viewed from the other side, the result has been an enforced increase
in liquidity preference. In the institutional environment of post-
war Indonesia these factors have resulted in increased holdings of
inactive balances, withheld from the monetary stream primarily in the
form of cash. Since inflationary tendencies in the econon have not
yet produced significant price rises, these balances have not generally
been converted to goods. However, it is clear that they have exerted
considerably pressure on the black market foreign exchange rates. To
the extent that the Indonesian trading and industrial community as
well as the foreign (primarily Dutch) civil service group in Djakarta
are unable to obtain the imported consumer goods on which they would
wish to spend these withdrawals from the income stream, there is some
tendency to transfer these balances abroad for purposes of delayed
consumption. This pressure has been observed particularly with
regard to the Netherlands guilder since the foreign business group
as well as the foreign civil service staff continues to be primarily
Dutch. Between December 1952 and July 1954 the black market rate for
the Dutch guilder rose from Rp. 4 to Rp. 8.1 During the same period
of time the black mrrket rate for the U. S. dollar rose from Rp. 22
per dollar to Rp. 28 per dollar. Thus it is obvious that the
pressure on the Dutch guilder was considerably greater than that on
the American dollar. While the use of inactive balances to purchase
foreign currencies on the black market does not exert direct pressures
on the domestic price level, it does have some bearing on economic
stability and economic development in Indonesia, If the supply of
foreign exchange thus dissipated were made available to the foreign
exchange authorities (i.e. converted at the official rate), it could
be employed to increase the supply of goods on Indonesian markets
and/or to finance the import of capital or raw material goods to
expand domestic production. Furthermore, in a recent article on
this subject, Professor C. F. Scheffer argues that this process in
1. Bank Indonesia Bulletin, No. 3, First and Second Quarter,
1954, Table 17, p. 14.
6fact brings funds from the idle to the active sphere. Scheffer con.-
eludes that this activation process is tantamount to exerting infla-
tionary pressures on price levels of imported goods. In his words,
"I believe that it is more correct not to say that part of the money
supply has been locked up in the financial circulation (which would
mean in effect saying that part of the money supply is hoarded), but
to say, that part of the money supply is counteracted by increased
price level of some imported goods." ± This argument is made on the
realistic assumption that black market transfers place rupiah in the
hands of upper income foreign groups, among which a high propensity to
import exists.
As Schefferts article indicates, observers in Indonesia are
becoming increasingly aware of the presence of the dangers of ex-
cessive liquidity. Yet it is difficult to estimate the volume and
distribution of these volatile balances. In addition to the indirect
evidence presented above, however, the banking system has reported
that there has been a significant increase in demand for safety
deposit vaults during past months. They have interpreted this to
mean that hoards are held in large part as cash and that the holders
of these balances are willing to sacrifice interest to keep the size
of their holdings from the surveillance of Indonesian officials.
Recent literature on the financing of economic development has
frequently suggested that the existence of such inactive balances
(monetary and non-monetary hoards) represents a pool of financial
resources which could be mobilized to finance economic development,
given a network of monetary institutions to collect them. The
following quotation from a widely distributed United Nations docu-
ment is representative:
We deal first with the possibility of financing of
the required capital investment not by increasing savings,
but by using the gold and foreign exchange which lie in
the hoards of some private individuals in underdeveloped
countries. It is not possible to be certain about the
size of these hoards. Inquiry suggests that they are
specially important in two areas, naly in South and
Southeast Asia and in the Middle East. It is estimated
that in some of the countries in these areas, private
gold hoards are as large as 10% of the national income.
These hoards could of course be used only once; if
spent over five years, they would contribute, on this
estimate, 2% of the national income to capital formation
during five years. This figure is small but it certainly
1. C. F. Scheffer, "A Note...", Ekonomi Dan Keuangan Indonesia,
Vol. 7, No. 10, October 1954, pp. 652-657.
7not to be neglected.
It is very desirable that governments should try to
get these hoards used for capital formation, It is how-
ever also very difficult. They cannot easily be requisi-
tioned because information about their whereabouts is
scanty. In our opinion, it is unlikely that the release
of private hoards will contribute much to capital forma-
tion in the near future.1
Activation of these inactive balances either through the private
banking system or through sale of bonds to the holders of these
balances would be tantamount to inflationary financing of development,
to the extent that these balances are residual from past incomes
rather than savings from current income. If one could be assured that
these balances would continue to remain inactive, it would be much
simpler to offset their existence by the simple creation of new money.
The problem is, however, that these balances will not necessari'ly
remain inactive; in fact, experience with this type of monetary over-
hang in other countries demnstrates that balances held primarily as
cash tend to be extremely volatile. If inflationary financing of the
government and economic development were undertaken on a large scale,
resulting pressures on supply would inevitably produce substantial
price rises. It is believed that a rapidly upward trend in price would
set in motion a flight to commodities. This is based on the simple
proposition that it is more advantageous to hold one's liquid assets
in the form of goods than in the form of cash in the face of price
rises. This trend would accentuate the shortage of--supply, already
apparent in the urban sector. In our opinion, therefore, unrestricted
use of this type of financing would lead to all the political and
economic dangers inherent in open inflation. These dangers could be
averted if the scope of such financing could be limited to approxi-
mately the level of current withdrawals (savings) from current income.
If this policy were to be effective, such withdrawals from current
income should not be offset by consumption expenditures (by others)
financed by private activation of idle balances held residually from
past incomes.
II. THE INDONESIAN MONEY MARKET
I would now like to review the existing institutional devices
for mobilization of voluntary savings against the background of the
existing inflationary potential of the Indonesian economy and the
1. United Nations, "Measures for the Economic Development of
Underdeveloped Countries,"New York, May 1951, pp. 35-36.
8complicating factor of large but unmeasured holdings of inactive
balances. It is clear that the problem of mobilizing voluntary savings
in Indonesia is not one of a shortage of financial institutions, If
anything, Indonesia is plagued by a proliferation of banking institu.
tions resulting in considerable duplication of lending functions, and
extension of credit with little coordinated monetary control, The
Indonesian financial system consists of a coplex series of banking
and monetary institutions, including a core of government financial
institutions, a network of foreign banks and finally a nmber of
private Indonesian banks. 1
The government banks include the Bank Indonesia the Bank Industri
Negara the Bank Negara Indonesia the a ndon e stan n
specialied l3inena"iendig agenciems an esLmu Desa
and Ja asn _Kredit), all almost exclusively"frno by
alloca roughthe central governmental budget. There is some
specialization of function among these governmental institutions. The
Bank Indonesia has been designated as the central bank since 1953.
Ioughrlending functions are eventually to be transferred to other
banking institutions, it continues to do a significant amount of
commercial business. Its central banking functions currently include
the exclusive reight of note issue and its role as the primary
source of direct credit for the government. The Bank Industri Ne ara
is primarily concerned with extension of long-term ~e nes an
estate agriculture, industry and mining. The Bank Negara Indonesia
specializes in the extension of credit to IndoneTan exporters &n
importers. It is thus used as a policy arm of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs in carrying out its bente policies. 2 The Bank
Rakat Indonesia was originally estab lid in 1946 to succeeT~e
DU colona M ene Volkscrediet.Bank. Originally, it was in-.
tended to replace thinitutinTn extending credit primarily
in the rural sector. However, its function was redefined in 1951; since
that time it has been designated as the agency to extend credit to
mdeium sized and small commercial and industrial firms. Since 1951
the percentage of this bank' s total credit offerings extended in the
rural sector has fallen from 49 to 21 percent, while the percentage
extended to medium-sized and small commercial and industrial concerns
and industries has risen from 43 to 66 percent. Both the Desa banks
and the Desa LuMgs have been revitalized since 1952. The Desa
banks arerimariy concerned with extending small monetary loans to
1. This is not the place to undertake a detailed review of
financial institutions in Indonesia. The interested reader may refer
to C. F. Scheffer, Het Bankwesen in Indonesie Sedert het Uitbreken van
de Tweede Wereldoor~ Da of"
credit n U one ven in recent Reports of the Bank Indonesia
(formerly Java Bank).
2. These policies are designed to promote the handling of export
and import business by Indonesian nationals. Special licensing and
credit arrangements are offered to en':ourage this development.
9agriculturalists, while the Desa L are concerned with extending
rice loans in the rural sector~ The- asah Kredit (Credit Foundation)
is essentially a governmental guarantor agency Its purpose is the
extension of financial assistance in the form of guarantees to worth..
while economic enterprises which are unable to provide collateral for
ordinary commercial bank loans. Guarantees are provided primarily
to amounts loaned through the Bank Negara Indonesia and the Bank
kat Indonesia. In additiono tse agencies with comer~l
bankng untions, the government operates a postal savings bank,
Bank T ,P~oo, and a state pawnshop service. The postal savings
EEN, wih a continuation of the Dutch service, has been in-
oreasingly successful in collecting small-scale deposits throughout
Indonesia. The state pawnshop service continues to expand gradually
both in terms of the number of pawn shops in existence and the total
amount of loans outstanding. All of the governmental financial
institutions with the exception of the Bank Indonesia have local
offices throughout the archipelago.
Lack of coordination in the operations of the governmental
financial institutions has been intensified by the recent entry of
several government ministries into the credit field. In a recent
report on the government's credit policy, 1 former Minister of
Economic Affairs Iskaq pointed out that his Ministry granted credits
to small firms in several areas of enterprise. Such credits are
administered through a number of specialised agencies including:
Jajasan Kredit (State Credit Agency), Djawatan Koperasi (The Depart..
ment for Cooperatives), the Crediet Industri Ketjil (Small Industries
Credit Bureau), Jajasan Fonds Keradjinan (Office for Handicrafts
Credits), and the Bank Rakjat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Bank).
Other ministries in the government have felt obliged to follow this
lead. The inistry of Agriculture grants credits through the Kantor
Gerakan Tani (Office for Peasant Movement) and through the Jajasan
Perkebunan Rakjat (The Smallholders Bureau). The Ministry of
Internrl Affairs performs a similar function through the Biro
Rekonstruksi Nasional (Bureau of National Reconstruction) while the
Ministry of Labor has its own credit agency in the Djawatan Penempatan
Penaga (Labor Exchange Office). The fact that these agencies
engage only in the extension of credits rather than collection of
resources from which credit may be extended underscores the necessity
for reorganization which would simplify the whole structure of govern-
ment credit operations.
There are seven important foreign private banks in Indonesia.
This foreign group performs banking services for the foreign community
and is primarily concerned with the financing of foreign enterprise.
Along with the government financial institutions, they dominate the
banking business in the country. At the end of 1953, the foreign
1. Antara: November 1, 1954.
and government banks had outstanding loans amounting to Rp. 2,758
million while private Indonesian banks held only Rp. 76 million
in outstanding loans. The emergence of private banks (now totalling
about 20) is predominant3y a postwar phenomenon. Statistics on the
operations of these banks were first collected and published by the
Bank Indonesia in 1954. Their credit has been largely extended to
small' exporters (in Sumatra) and to small traders (Java).
The final component of the financial system in Indonesia is
the newly organised stock exchange in Djakarta. This exchange began
business at jakarta on June 4, 1952. It has provided some service
by providing facilities for turnover of securities now outstanding.
However, no new government or industrial issues have been floated on
the exchange, hence it has not been instrumental in mobilising
domestic savings. In the recent report of the Cank Indonesia, the
Governor of the Bank describes the activities of the stock exchange in
these terms:
'Unfortunately it must be admitted the stock exchange
business here in Indonesia is still of little significance...
This state of affairs must be attributed in large measure
to the public's general unfamiliarity with the possibilities
of the stock exchange, and to the great inclination to in-
vest savings in real estate and movables.1
Table 4. CREDIT OUTSTAN)ING: BANK INDONESIA,
BANK NEGARA INDONESIA, BANK INDUSTRI NEGARA, AND
SEVEN FOREIGN PRIVATE BANKS (JAN. 1953 TO AUGUST, 1953)
(Rp. million)
January March June August
Semi-government enterprises 434.8 275.7 313.0 30.7
Autonomous bodies 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.0
Banks and credit institutions 130.6 54.4 57.2 58.1
Insurance companies and saving banks 3.9 1.8 5.5 5.8
Rice-ills 6.1 6.3 6.9 7.7
Trade in domestic products 52.8 56.4 50.7 50.3
Exporters 221.1 190.4 261.0 269.7
Importers 527.5 602.7 571.6 581.7
Sugar Plantations 487.8 480.0 533.0 575.9
Other plantations 184.9 155.4 205.8 197.9
Industrial enterprises 149.9 202.0 277.2 239.1
Storage and transport enterprises 98.1 1o6.4 92.2 102.5
Other enterprises 84.2 74.9 132.5 129.5
Individuals 15.1 16.5 12.1 12.7
TOTAL 2,369.8 12,223.2 2,519. 2j72. 6
1. Report Bank Indonesia, 1953-1954, po 75.
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rable 5. CREDIT OUTSTANDING: TWENTY INDONESIAN
PRIVATE BANKS
(Rp. '000)
1953
September 30 December 31
Trade 51,599 54,231
Industry 12,021 11,857
Transportation 4,506 4,013
Estate agriculture 2,660 3,013
Individuals 1,217 1,601
Sundry 3,571 1,24
Total 75,574 75,9939
ource: Report Bank Indonesia, 1953-1954.
The credits extended by the major components of this system of
financial institutions are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. The data
in Table 4 indicate that approximately one-half the credit extended by
the government banking complex and the large foreign banks flows to
the government and trading sectors of the econonr. Similarly, over
two-thirds of the credit extended by Indonesian private banks was
absorbed by the trading sector (Table 5). The other important con-
sumer of organized credit-agricultural plantations-relied heavily
upon the resources of the foreign banking system,
This description of the Indonesian money market would be incom-
plete without some reference to the unorganized money market. One
of the distinct features of the credit system in Indonesia is the
significant differences in conditions and terms of credit extended
through these components of the money market. Small producers and
traders (particularly retailers) are still forced to rely on the
unorganized money market for short-term, unsecured credit. In
random interviews with these borrowers, I found that even credit
facilities made available by the government 'e.g., Bank Rakjat) are
impractical when ready access to credit is required. It was
emphasised that it takes considerable time to get a loan from a
governmental or semi-governmental institution processed. Further-
more, strict collateral requirements are maintained. Similarly, the
standards demanded by private foreign and Indonesian banks cannot be
met by many small borrowers. The guarantor provision of Jajasan
Kredit is also selective. Thus they are forced to rely on private
lenders. Interest rates on credit from this source vary between two
12
and ten percent per month depending on informal conditions surrounding
the loan-personal contacts, prestige and status. Since there is
little flow of financial resources between the organised and unorganised
money markets, a discontinuous interest rate structure emerges.
Interest rates on loans extended through the government banks and the
private banking system tend to be relatively low since these loans are
offered primarily to relatively secure borrowers. On the other hand,
interest rates obtained in the informal financial sector are several
times as high as the rates in the organised sector of the money market.
Credit is not available on terms or at rates between these extremes.
These symptons of the undeveloped credit system existing in Indonesia
have significant bearing on the prospects for mobilising savings
through public or private devices. Savings voluntarily withdran
from current or past income streams may be loaned out through the
informal money market at extremely high rates of interest. Since the
existing financial institutions do not mobilize savings on a large'
scale, their resources are inadequate to provide credit on a scale
adequate to force these rates down. The net effect is that savings
loaned in the informal sector are associated with a high rate of
return. To the extent that interest rates induce savings in Indonesia,
this factor tends to keep them out of the organised money market,
Where rates on time deposits are relatively low this complicates the
problem of monetary control and allows credit to be extended for
purposes (i.e. increased consumption) not consistent with developmental
objectives. In short, credit extended from deflationary sources(savings) tends to be used in large part for consumption purposes;
credit extended from inflationary sources (the banking system,
financed by the government deficit) may be for primarily productive
purposes, but is restricted to prime borrowers. Hence it is critical
that efforts be made to channel the resources now dissipated through
the unorganized sector of the money market to the organised sector
where credit is subject to the control of monetary authorities.
III. TIlE MONEY !'ARK AND MOBILIZATION OF VOLUNTARY SAVINGS
The degree of efficacy of the organised governmental foreign
and private banks in mobilising savings from current (and past)
income can be demonstrated by comparing their holdings of time and
savings deposits with the total money supply. These data are
presented in Table 6.
Statistics for time deposits accumulated through cooperatives
are not available, However, there are indications that coopera-
tives have been relatively effective in mobilizing savings from
current income.1 Table 6 indicates that the postal savings banks
have been more successful than arV other component of the banking
system in accumulating actual savings,
1. Java Bank Report, 1952-1953, pp. 77-78.
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fable 6. TOTAL MONEY SUPPLY ANT) TIME DEPOSITS
December 1953
(Rp. million)
Deember 1951 December 195
lime Deposits:
a. Combined figuresl 85 119
b. Twenty private banks2  12 14
a. Postal savings banks3  12
Total time deposits
money Supply:4
a. Currency 3,328 5,218
b. Deposits 1804 2 424
Total money supply
tio: Time deposits to money supply .031 .033
The ratio of savings mobilized through the banking system(defined as savings or time deposits) is alarmingly low even when
compared to other underdeveloped countries. The ratio as computed
from Table 6 is shown as only three percent. In recent years, this
ratio has been about 19 percent in India (as an example of an un-
developed country) and about 45 percent in the United States. The
ratio of time deposits to money supply has remained relatively
constant over the period observed, in spite of fairly strenuous
efforts to increase time deposits. These efforts have been unim-
pressive because they have been offset by rapid expansion of the
total money supply. The figures in Table 6 do not include the
amounts of savings accumulated by private savings banks. These
have been reported for the first time in 1954. At the end of 1953
savings in private savings banks stood at Rp. 18.5 millio, by the
end of September 1954 they had risen to Rp. 20.7 million.
1. Bank Indonesia, Bank Negara Indonesia, Bank Industri Negara
and Seven Foreign Private Banks; Source, Bank Indonesia Reports
1951-1952, 1952-1953.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. For December 1951: Java Bank Report, 1951-1952; for December 1953:
Bank Indonesia Bulletin, No. 2, Fourth Quarter, 1953, p. 5.
5. Bank Indonesia Bulletin, No. 4, Third Quarter, 1954, po 12, These
accounts should be distinguished from time deposits in private Indonesian
(commercial) banks, included in Table 6.
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During 1954 particularly gratifying results were shown by the
post office savings bank and the national private banks. Savings
deposits at the post office savings bank rose from Rp. 123 million at
the end of 1953 to Rp. 146 million at the end of September 1954. Time
deposits in the twenty national private banks rose from Rp. 14 million
at the end of 1953 to Rp. 37.3 million at the end of September 1954.
However, since statistical reporting by the private banks is only
now getting underway, this increase in part may be attributed to a
more effective statistical coverage. Including the newly recorded
savings at private savings banks and these increases in time deposits
at the post office savings bank and the private Indonesian (commercial)
banks, the ratio of time and savings deposits to the total money supply
continued to hover near three percent at the end of September 1954.
Once again, significant achievements of the banki'ng system in accumi-
lating savings were offset by greatly expanded money supply (from
Rp. 7,642 million at the end of 1953 to Rp. 9,666 at the end of
September 1954).
These figures suggest that the Indonesian banks are not serving
as financial intermediaries, mobilizing their own resources for
extension of credit. This problem is underlined by the fact that
Indonesian banks have not been able to dispose of their capital stock
by sales to the public, but have rather had to rely on government
capital provision. The Governor of the Bank Indonesia referred to
this problem in these terms:
In general I have to state that insufficient atten-
tion has been devoted to what I have described above as
the first essential--sufficient capital of their own in
private balances. There was still too persistent an in-
clination to open up banking and credit businesses with
capital which had been advanced by the government or the
central bank. Attempts to attract credit balances from
the private individual were not sufficiently fostered.
Instead the chief inclination has been to try and obtain
government depositse
My own view is that this tendency is to be re-
gretted because it is alien to the standards of a
sound banking system which stands or falls according to
the contribution of the bank's own capital and the
attraction Giro (clearing) balances and money deposits
from third parties by the private Indonesian banks is an
absolutely essential first step towards building up of
capital funds in the Indonesian community. The Indonesian
banks will have to prove their social function and their
usefulness by being in a position to inspire public con-
fidence and attract money from third parties, nothowever,
by lending money-which obviously regard as their main
object--from funds provided by the government or by the
central bank. By so doing they would in the end become
mere branch offices of the government or the central
bank. At the same time every attention must of course
be given to the establishment of a well-equipped and
efficiently functioning administration. 1
In short, practically all of the funds which are available to the
government and the private Indonesian banks are obtained from govern-
ment subscription to capital, government advances or advances from
the Bank Indonesia. Capital subscription in the case of the govern-
ment banks has been almost exclusively provided by the government.
In addition, the government has deposited its own funds or authorised
the Bank Indonesia to deposit its funds in the government financial
institutions. It is these funds from a combination of government
sources which by and large provide the working capital for Indonesian
banking operations rather than funds withdrawn from the monetary
stream in the form of savings or time deposits.
It should also be pointed out that the ratio of demand deposits to
total money supply is considerably lower than in advanced countries, 2
In fact,' this ratio has fallen during the past few years, indicating
that assets are being held in even more liquid form than demand
deposits. The ratio of demand deposits to total money supply fell
from 49 percent at the end of 1947 to 41 percent at the end of 1950.
By the end of 1951 this ratio had fallen to 35 percent, and during
1954 averaged 30.7 percent. In part, this trend reflects the fact
that money newly generated through the government deficit is ordinarily
put into circulation as cash rather than through deposit currency.
However, a more basic reason lies beneath the recent changes in the
composition of the total money supply. As the new Indonesian
government has become more firmly established, enforcement of direct
taxes has been increasingly tightened. To a large extent taxation
of the upper income groups has depended on visible evidences of
wealth, of which bank accounts are one of the most obvious indicatorso
Firms liable to taxation are not required by law to register with tax
authorities. The administrative staff available to check reported
statements of income and assets is inadequate to undertake thorough
checks. Hence, accounts held at government private banks have been
utilized to estimate current income and assets for both the direct
income taxes on individuals and business and for the capital assets
tax. As this policy has become more generally employed by tax
authorities the upper income groups have tended to shy away from the
use of bank deposits. Banking authorities in Indonesia indicated to
1. Java Bank Report, 1952-1953, p. 78.
2. In the United States this ratio has averaged about 80 percent
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me that there had been a noticeable shift from the use of deposits to
the use of safety deposit boxes, the latter being outside the
surveillance of tax authority.
A number of other factors were suggested by banking and business
people in Indonesia, They emphasized that the monetary purge of 1950
had left in its wake a fear of holding money in terms of deposits.
Although this purge covered both deposits and currency, it is now
felt that there would be some advance leakage of a new reduction in
the value of money. Hence it is desirable to hold money in the most
liquid form so that when these rumors of an imminent monetary purge
began to circulate conversion to goods could immediately be undertaken
The same holds true with regard to the desire to maintain liquidity in
order to covert to goods if price rises should begin to jeopardize the
value of money. In both cases, the fear that a freeze in deposits might
be undertaken to prevent shifting from cash to goods was clearly
related to the low level of deposits in postwar Indonesia.
With regard to the lower income groups, primarily in the rural
sector, it was suggested that such factors as the lack of experience
in holding assets in terms of deposits as well as little sensitivity
to the interest-earning aspect of deposits were important obstacles to
mobilization of savings through the banks. In the rural sector, high
liquidity preference, even among the lower income groups, was related
to high time preferences and heavy discount of the future. Further-
more, the inducement to save for old age or emergencies reduced by the
ability to finance these needs through the family or village, a
distinct characteristic of society, in rural Indonesia. In both
sectors of the economy, therefore, it appeared clear that the advan-
tages of holding one's assets in the form of bank deposits were either
not consciously recognized or it was the considered judgment of the
potential depositer that deposits in the banking system would involve
distinct disadvantages. Where there is a rational basis for fear of
holding one's assets in the form of bank deposits government policy
aimed at dispelling the basis for this fear might well be effective
in increasing savings. Suggestions to cope with some of these pro-
blems will be offered below.
This review of the structure of existing financial and monetary
system in Indonesia does not appear to augur well for financing
economic development through mobilization of voluntary savings by
the banking system. The bold outlines of our analysis are as follows:
1. The need for the extension of credit to private industrial
and agricultural firms is great. Although there is a multiplicity of
financial institutions in Indonesia, the demand for investment credit
is far from satisfied
2. Existing financial institutions, both public and private, are
not effective in mobilizing savings from current income to provide for
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the credit needs of the econorrr.
3. To the extent that credit is offered by the existing institu-
tional structure, it is mainly short term in nature and flows primarily
to the public sector and to the trading function in the private sector.
Thus the major unsatisfied credit needs are those most closely related
to economic development, i.e. long term credit for investment purposes.
4. The basis for the extension of credit by both governmental
and private institutions is inflationary in character. The items in
the capital and liability account against which credit is offered
represent either governmental or semi-governmental subscriptions to
bank capital or governmental or Bank Indonesia deposits in the banking
system. Since the government during the past few years has been
operating at a substantial deficit, its venture into the credit field
should be recognized as a major factor in accentuating the budgetary
deficit.
5. All of this is against the background of a disproportionately
large monetary overhang in the form of inactive but highly volatile
idle balances. The objective of mobilizing savings from current income
is threatened since expanded deposits in the financial system might
achieve nothing more than locking up existing idle balances rather than
producing reductions in consumption by withdrawing savings from
current income.
These considerations clarify the role which the banking system
should strive to assume in the financing of Indonesian economic
development. The extension of credit itself is inflationary in
character., This is doubly true where credit is essentially a drain
on government resources mobilized by inflationary methods. In the
present context, this suggests that the use of credit now extended
through financial institutions in Indonesia should be carefully
scrutinized. Credit for consumption purposes should be strictly
limited. Investment credit extended to productive enterprises should
be allocated on the basis of a system of priorities, including such
factors as the incremental-capital-output-ratios and production
gestation periods in firms competing for credit. Moreoever, from
both the point of view of controlling inflationary pressures and
the principles of sound governmental finance, efforts should be made
to provide the basis for credit extension from resources mobilized
through the banking system rather than through the government
budget. Efforts should be made to mobilize time (and savings)
deposits to provide for financing of investment through the banking
system. This calls for reveral of the trend which was recently
developed in Indonesia. As indicated above, financing credit opera-
tions of both governmental and private institutions has represented
a significant drain on government resources. In addition to limiting
the inflationary impetus of credit extension, replacing this subsidy
by mobilization of domestic savings would, therefore, be an important
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factor in reducing the size of the government deficit. In recent
years, amounts budgeted for the provision of capital to financial
institutions has averaged from Rp. I to 2 billion, or from 10 to
20 percent of the total level of government expenditures. In the
195 budget something over one-half billion rupiah is budgeted for
providing capital to private banking institutions. In addition, the
government will continue to provide capital for the governmental
banking institutions. Hence, the short-run goal toward which the
Indonesian financial system should aim is mobilization of adequate
voluntary savings from current income to provide for the credit
needs of the private sector of the econonw. Let us now inquire into
the possibilities of achieving this goal.
There has been some tendency to believe that the performance of
this function can be best stimulated by the proliferation of new
financial institutions, a tendency which has gained increasing vogue
in Indonesia during the past few years. In particular, governmental
institutions to lend specialized types of credit to a variety of
borrowers have increased at an alarming rate during the tenure of
the past two Indonesian Cabinets. This is particularly alarming since
these institutions have been designed more to offer credit rather
than to mobilise resources from which credit might be extended. In
addition, there have been strenuous efforts to increase the number of
private banks without developing the framwork of a coordinated
monetary system. These banks are relatively weak, and, as pointed
out above, are dependent upon government subsidization for funds
from which to provide credit. A sprawling system of government
subsidized public and private financial institutions is clearly not
the answer to mobilizing domestic savings to perform a role in
economic development. Therefore, the first step towards solving the
problem in Indonesia would seem to be coordination of institutions
concerned with mobilisation of financial resources and credit opera-
tions. Branch banking undertaken by the stronger governmental and
private institutions might be one answer to this problem.
Whatever the structure of financial institutions that emerges
in Indonesia, it is clear that private financial institutions should
concentrate primarily on expanding their demand and time deposits,
while the government role in this program should be aimed at mobilizing
voluntary savings through attractive government bond issues. New
banking institutions should not be licensed and promoted unless they
are able to accumulate a minimum amount of their own (private)
capital and deposits. In order to insure the enforcement of this
requirement, it might be useful to set a minimum capital-loan ratio
as well as a minimum time deposit-loan ratio, The latter would be
particularly pertinent for those banks which are venturing into the
fields of investment credit. These provisions would force the
banks to curtail inflationary extension of credit or, alternatively,
to expand their holdings of actual domestic savings.
(V
19
Hiow:ever, it is clear that the initiative for expanding the amount
of capital and time deposits supplied to banks does not rest primarily
with the banking institutions. Steps should, therefore, be taken to
promote the habit of holding liquid assets in the form of bank
liabilities (demand and time deposits and bank capital). It is
suggested that both negative and positive inducements could be
offered. With regard to negative inducements, an extension of a
foreign exchange provision now in force might be helpful. The
Central Import Office has just announced that beginning January 35, 1955
importers will be obliged to submit a document verifying a statement
of their current account with the banks, to demonstrate that their
financial position justifies the issuance of an import permit of the
size which they are seeking. The intention of this regulation is to
prevent Indonesian nationals, who have special privileges in obtaining
import permits, from reselling these permits to other importers.
This provision could be extended to promote mobilisation of voluntary
savings by requiring that a certain composition of time and demand
deposits exist before the applicant be given an import permit.
With regard to positive inducements, the first step might consist
of attempts to remove the obstacles to deposits outlined above. If
it is true that the major obstacle to increasing bank holdings of
deposits results from fear of disclosure of one's assets to tax
authorities, it might be worthwhile to declare one's assets held in
banks outside the scope of investigation by tax authorities. This
could be replaced, from the tax administration point of view, by
requiring that taxpayers submit statements of their current and
fixed assets. Intentional misrepresentation could then be punishable
by law. If it is true that a fear of loss of value resulting from
holding one's assets in the form of time deposits is a major deterent
to the deposit habit, the banking system as a whole might experiment
with some system of tying the value of time deposits to the value
of a number of basic commodities. Experience with the use of this
type parity deposits elsewhere has suggested that this device is
extremely effective in increasing the amounts of time deposits. With
regard to fear of loss of value resulting from government policy such
as the 1950 "monetary purge", assurances could be given that no such
"purge" will again be made, or if made, will not apply to time
deposits.
An interesting experiment, undertaken by the provincial government
of Central Sumatra, might be generalised to promote savings habits
through the use of time or savings deposits. Bank collection of
savings from current income to provide a basis for credit extension
has been greatly facilitated by establishing premiums in the form of
savings deposits for prompt payment of loans. If repayment and
interest payments are made on time, the borrower from Desa Lumbun
receive half of the interest payments as savdng depositsN R hes
banks., Provincial officials reported that this system has been
effective both in preventing defaulting on loan payments and in
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substantially increasing the amounts of savings deposits collected by
the Desa Lumbung s.
Public Mobilization of Voluntary Savings:
Finally, the role of the government in mobilizing voluntary savings
through the issue of bonds might be briefly examined. Indonesian fiscal
officials generally felt that this device could be effectively employed
on a wider scale. The government has floated few new issues in recent
years; those floated have been well subscribed. It might be advisable
for the government to set the precedent of mobilising savings through
the stock exchange by floating its bond issues through this institu-
tional device.
Much has been written about the means by which sale of government
bonds in underdeveloped countries might be promoted. 1 The literature
has been concerned with incentives for promoting public absorption of
government bond issues. Such incentives have included references to
increased yields, lottery features, appeal to local interest and, finally,
tax incentives. In some underdeveloped countries lottery features
have been particularly attractive, although in some areas with
particular religious orientations, they may be objectionable on moral
grounds. In vy personal experience in Indonesia, it was emphasized
that voluntary subscriptions could be expanded if some link between
personal sacrifice and local interest were established. Thus bond
issues for financing of specified local projects might result in
increased popular subscription. The scope of tax incentives appears to
be limited bacause of relatively ineffective enforcement of direct
taxation against the upper income groups, It appears, however, that
incentives adapted to the particular institutional and economic
setting existing in Indonesia could be f ound, With the present high
premium on imported goods generally and particularly on imported luxury
goods, public subscription to bond issues could undoubtedly be stimu.
lated by special import concessions. This could be done, for example,
by allowing recipients of bond interest payments to qualify for duty-
free import permits for goods now restricted or on the list of high
import surcharges to the extent of their interest earnings,
1. See for example Part B of "Mobilization of Domestic Capital:
Report and Documents of the First Working Party of Experts", ECAFE,
Bangkok, 1952. Section B is entitled "Measuring for Increasing Sales
of Government Bonds".
